Privacy Preserving Multi-Agent Planning with Provable Guarantees by Beimel, Amos & Brafman, Ronen I.
PP MAP with Provable Guarantees
Privacy Preserving Multi-Agent Planning with Provable
Guarantees
Amos Beimel beimel@cs.bgu.ac.il
Ronen Brafman brafman@cs.bgu.ac.il
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,
Be’er Sheva, Israel
Abstract
In privacy-preserving multi-agent planning, a group of agents attempt to cooperatively
solve a multi-agent planning problem while maintaining private their data and actions.
Although much work was carried out in this area in past years, its theoretical foundations
have not been fully worked out. Specifically, although algorithms with precise privacy guar-
antees exist (Yao, 1982; Goldreich, Micali, & Wigderson, 1987), even their most efficient
implementations are not fast enough on realistic instances, whereas for practical algorithms
no meaningful privacy guarantees exist. secure mafs (Brafman, 2015), a variant of the
multi-agent forward search algorithm (Nissim & Brafman, 2014a) is the only practical al-
gorithm to attempt to offer more precise guarantees, but only in very limited settings and
with proof sketches only. In this paper we formulate a precise notion of secure computation
for search-based algorithms and prove that secure mafs has this property in all domains.
We also provide a proof of its completeness.
1. Introduction
As our world becomes better connected and more open ended, and autonomous agents
are no longer science fiction, a need arises for enabling groups of agents to cooperate in
generating a plan for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone, in a cost-effective
manner. Indeed, much like ad-hoc networks, one would expect various contexts to naturally
lead to the emergence of ad-hoc teams of agents that can benefit from cooperation. Such
teams could range from groups of manufacturers teaming up to build a product that none
can build on their own, to groups of robots sent by different agencies or countries to help
in disaster settings. To perform complex tasks, these agents need to combine their diverse
skills effectively. Planning algorithms can help achieve this goal.
Most planning algorithms require full information about the set of actions and state
variables in the domain. However, often, various aspects of this information are private to
an agent, and it is not eager to share them. For example, the manufacturer is eager to let
everyone know that it can supply motherboards, but it will not want to disclose the local
process used to construct them, its suppliers, its inventory level, and the identity of its
employees. Similarly, rescue forces of country A may be eager to help citizens of country
B suffering from a tsunami, but without having to provide detailed information about the
technology behind their autonomous bobcat to country B, or to country C’s humanoid
evacuation robots. In both cases, agents have public capabilities they are happy to share,
and private processes and information that support these capabilities, which they prefer (or
possibly require) to be kept private.
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With this motivation in mind, a number of algorithms have recently been devised for
distributed privacy-preserving planning (Bonisoli, Gerevini, Saetti, & Serina, 2014; Torren˜o,
Onaindia, & Sapena, 2014; Luis & Borrajo, 2014; Nissim & Brafman, 2014b). In these al-
gorithms, agents supply a public interface only, and through a distributed planning process,
come up with a plan that achieves the desired goal without being required to share a com-
plete model of their actions and local state with other agents. But there is a major caveat:
it is well known from the literature on secure multi-party computation (Yao, 1982) that
the fact that a distributed algorithm does not require an agent to explicitly reveal private
information does not imply that other agents cannot deduce such private information from
other information communicated during the run of the algorithm. Consequently, given that
privacy is the raison-d’etre for these algorithms, it is important to strive to improve the
level of privacy provided, and to provide formal guarantees of such privacy properties.
To the best of our knowledge, to date, there have been two attempts to address this
issue. In (Tozicka, Stolba, & Komenda, 2017), the authors describe a secure planner for
multi-agent systems. However, as they themselves admit, this planner is impractical, as
it requires computing all possible solutions. (Brafman, 2015) describes secure mafs a
modification of the multi-agent forward search algorithm (Nissim & Brafman, 2014a)
in which an agent never sends similar states. secure mafs is an efficient algorithm. In fact,
an implementation of it based on an equivalent macro sending technique (Maliah, Shani,
& Brafman, 2016) shows state of the art performance. But it is not clear what security
guarantees it offers. While (Brafman, 2015) provides some privacy guarantees, they are
restricted to very special cases, and it seems most plausible that secure mafs is not secure
in general.
The goal of this paper is to place the development of secure mafs on firm footing
by developing appropriate notions of privacy that are useful and realizable in the context
of search algorithms, to characterize the privacy preserving properties of secure mafs
and to provide rigorous proofs for its correctness and completeness. We define a notion
of β-indistinguishable secure computation, and more specifically, we suggest a notion of
PST-secure computation which is not as strong as that of strong privacy, but is meaningful
and more stringent than weak privacy. Roughly speaking, given a function β on planning
instances, we say that an algorithm is β-indistinguishable if it will send the same messages
during computation for any two instances whose β value is identical. PST-secure compu-
tation refers to the special case in which β returns a projected version of the search space
– one in which only the value of public variables is available.
The paper is structured as follows: First, we describe the basic model of privacy-
preserving classical multi-agent planning. Then, we discuss some basic notions of privacy.
Next, we gradually develop more practical versions of PST-secure planning algorithms,
eventually describing an algorithm that is, essentially secure mafs, and prove that the
latter is sound and complete, and is PST-secure.
2. The Model
ma-strips (Brafman & Domshlak, 2008) is a minimal extension of strips to multi-agent
domains. A strips problem is a 4-tuple Π = 〈P,A, I,G〉, where
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• P is a finite set of primitive propositions, which are essentially the state variables; a
state is a truth assignment to P .
• I is the initial state.
• G is the set of goal states.
• A is a set of actions. Each action a has the form a = 〈pre(a), eff(a)〉, where pre(a) ⊂ P
is the set of preconditions of a and eff(a) is a set of literals, denoting the effects of
action a. We use a(s) to denote the state attained by applying a in s. The state a(s)
is well defined iff s |= pre(a). In that case, a(s) |= p (for p ∈ P ) iff p ∈ eff(a) or s |= p
and ¬p 6∈ eff(a).
A plan pi = a1, . . . , am is a solution to Π iff am(· · · a1(s) · · · ) |= G.
An ma-strips problem is a strips problem in which the action set A is partitioned
among a set Φ = {ϕi}ki=1 of agents. Formally, Π = 〈P, {Ai}ki=1, I, G〉, where P, I,G are as
above, and Ai is the set of actions of ϕi.
Work on privacy-preserving multi-agent planning seeks algorithms that generate good,
or possibly optimal plans while not disclosing private information about their actions and
the variables that they manipulate. For this to be meaningful, one has to first define what
information is private and what information is not. Here we focus on the standard notion
of private actions and private propositions. Thus, each action ai ∈ Ai is either private
to agent ϕi or public. Similarly, each proposition p is either private to some agent ϕi or
public. To make sense, however, p can be private to agent ϕi only if p does not appear in
the description of an action aj ∈ Aj for j 6= i. Similarly, ai can be private to ϕi only if all
propositions in ai’s preconditions are either public or private to ϕi and all propositions in
ai’s effects are private to ϕi.
Hence, a privacy preserving ma-strips problem (pp-mas) is defined by as a set of local
planning problems: Π = {Πi : i = 1, . . . , k} where Πi = 〈P prvi , P pub, Aprvi , Apubi , Ii, Ipub, G〉.
Here, Ipub is the value of P pub in the initial state, and the goal is shared among all agents
and involves public propositions only. Furthermore, any action a ∈ Aprvi involves private
propositions only. We use Ai to denote A
prv
i ∪ Apubi . A solution for a pp-mas problem is
the sequence of all the public actions in a solution for the ma-strips problem.
We note that a more refined notion of privacy was suggested in (?, ?). While we believe
that the ideas discussed in this paper can be extended to this setting, we leave this for
future work.
Recall that in classical planning, we assume that the world state is fully observable
to the acting agent and actions are deterministic. The multi-agent setting shares these
assumptions, except that full observability is w.r.t. the primitive propositions in P prvi ∪P pub.
An issue that often arises is whether private goals should be allowed, or should all goals
be public. Public goals make it easier for all agents to detect goal achievement, and have
been assumed in most past work. As there is a simple reduction from private to public
goals, albeit one that makes public the fact that all private goals of an agent have been
achieved, we will maintain the assumption that all goal propositions are public.
Next, we define the notion of a public projection. The public projection piproj(a) of an
action a ∈ Ai, a = 〈pre(a), eff(a)〉, is defined as piproj(a) = 〈{p ∈ P pub|p ∈ pre(a)}, {` ∈
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P pub|` ∈ eff(a)}〉. That is, the same action, but with its private propositions removed.
Accordingly, piproj(a) for a ∈ Aprvi is empty. The public projection piproj(s) of a state is the
partial assignment obtained by projecting s to P pub.
Now, we define piproj(Π), the public projection of Π = {Πi : i = 1, . . . , k} to be the
strips planning problem: 〈P pub, {piproj(a) : a ∈ Apubi , 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, Ipub, G〉.
The search-tree induced by a planning problem plays a key role in our definition of
privacy in distributed forward search planning.
Definition 1. The search tree associated with an MA planning problem Π = 〈P, {Ai}ki=1, I, G〉,
denoted by ST(Π), is a tree inductively defined below, where every node is labeled by a state
and is either private to some agent or public, and every edge is labeled by an action. The
root is labeled by I, and is public. The children of a node v labeled by a state s are defined
as follows:
• If v is public, then for every a applicable in s there is a child labeled by a(s).
• If v is private to ϕi, then for every a ∈ Ai applicable in s there is a child labeled by
a(s).
• In both cases, the node a(s) is public if a is public, and a(s) is private to ϕi if a is
private to ϕi.
• The edge from s to a(s) is labeld by a.
We will also assume the existence of some lexicographic ordering over states which defines
the order of the children of a node. We assume that public variables appear before private
variables in this order.
Next we define a concept of the public projection of a search tree. First, we project
all states into their public parts. Then, we connect every public node to its closest public
descendants, remove all private nodes, and remove duplicate children in the resulting tree.
Formally:
Definition 2. The public-projection of the search tree of Π (denoted PST(Π)) is a tree,
defined below, whose nodes are labeled by assignments to the public variables of Π and edges
are labeled by public actions. Each node in PST(Π) corresponds to a list of public nodes in
the search-tree ST (Π), where the public states of all the nodes in the list are the public state
of the node in PST(Π) (this list is used only to construct PST(Π) from ST(Π) and is not
part of PST(Π)). The tree is inductively defined.
• The root of PST(Π) corresponds to the root of ST(Π) and is labeled by Ipub.
• Let w be a node in PST(Π), with public state s, that corresponds to public nodes
v1, . . . , vk in the search tree ST(Π). Denote the (public and private) states of v1, . . . , vk
by s1, . . . , sk respectively. We define the children of w in two stages:
– First, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and every public descendants v′ of vi such that all
internal nodes in the path from vi to v
′ are private, i.e., the labels of the edges
on the path from vi to v
′ are actions a1, . . . , a` such that a1, . . . , a`−1 are private
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actions and a` is a public action, we construct a child w
′. We label the edge from
w to w′ by the last actions on this path, namely, by a`. The public state of w′ is
the public state in ak(· · · a2(a1(si))) and we associate v′ to w′.
– We remove duplicated children. That is, if w1 and w2 are children of w such that
the actions labeling the edges (w,w1) and (w,w2) are the same and the public
states of w1 and w2 are the same, then we merge w1 and w2 and associate all the
nodes associated to them to the merged node. We repeat this process until there
are no children that can be merged.
3. Privacy Guarantees
The main property of interest from a solution algorithm to a pp-mas planning problem,
aside from soundness and completeness, is the level of privacy it preserves. The main
privacy-related question one asks regarding a pp-mas algorithm is whether coalitions of
agents participating in the planning algorithm will be able to gain information about the
private propositions and actions of other agents.
In what follows we work under the following assumptions:
• Agents are honest, but curious. This is a well known assumption in secure multi-party
computation (see, e.g., (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009)). According to this assumption,
which we believe applies to many real-world interactions among business partners
and ad-hoc teams, the agents perform the algorithm as specified, but are curious
enough to collude and try to learn what they can about the other agents without
acting maliciously. (Alternatively, consider malicious agents that eavesdrop on the
communication among agents, but are not part of the team, so they cannot intervene.)
• The algorithm is synchronous. That is agent operate with a common clock, and send
messages in rounds and these messages are immediately delivered without corruption
or delay.
• Perfect security, that is, even an unbounded adversary cannot learn any additional
information beyond the leakage function (defined below).
To date, most work was satisfied with algorithms that never explicitly expose private
information, typically by encrypting this information prior to communicating it to other
agents. Consequently, we say that an algorithm is weakly private if the names of private
actions and private state variables and their values are never communicated explicitly.
However, the fact that information is not explicitly communicated is not sufficient.
Consider, for example an algorithm in which agents share with each other their complete
domains, except that the names of private actions and state variables are obfuscated by
(consistently) replacing each with some arbitrary random string. This satisfies the re-
quirement of weak privacy, but provides the other agents with a complete model that is
isomorphic to the real model. For example, imagine a producer who expects exclusivity
from its suppliers. With this scheme, the producer will not know the real names of other
customers of its suppliers, but it will certainly learn of their existence. Similarly, a shipping
company may not want to have others learn about the size of its fleet, or the number of
workers it employs.
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At the other extreme we have strong privacy . We say that an algorithm is strongly
private if no coalition of agents can deduce from the information obtained during a run
of this algorithm any information that it cannot deduce from the public projection of the
planning problem, the private information the coalition has (i.e., the initial states and the
actions of the agents in the coalition), and the public projection of “its solution”. As we
are considering search problems, where many solutions can exists, the traditional privacy
definition for functions does not apply. The problem is that the solution chosen by the
algorithm can leak information (e.g., an algorithm that returns the lexicographically first
solution leaks no previous solutions exists). See (Beimel, Carmi, Nissim, & Weinreb, 2008)
for a discussion on this problem and a suggestion of a definition of privacy for search
problems.
Furthermore, strong privacy is likely to be very difficult to achieve and to prove unless
stronger cryptographic methods are introduced. With the latter, it will be possible to
develop algorithms that are strongly private, but, at least with our current knowledge, this
is likely to come at substantial computational cost that will render them not practical for
the size of inputs we would like to consider. Weak privacy, on the other hand, seems too
weak in most cases, and provides no real guarantee, as it is not clear what information is
deducible from the algorithm.
Given this state of affairs, where in the existing algorithms strong privacy is not as
practical as desired, whereas weak privacy tells us little, if anything, about the information
that might be leaked, it is important to provide tools that will specify the privacy guarantees
of existing and new algorithms. Here we would like to suggest a type of privacy “lower-
bound” in the form of an indistinguishability guarantee. More specifically, given a function
β defined on planning domains, we say that an algorithm is β-indistinguishable, if a coalition
of agents participating in the planning algorithm solving a problem Π cannot distinguish
between the current domain and any other domains Π′ such that β(Π) = β(Π′). We provide
two equivalent definitions of privacy.
We define the view of the of a set of agents T , denoted viewT (x), in an execution of a
deterministic algorithm with inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) as all the information it sees during
the execution, namely, the inputs of the agents in T (namely, (xi)i∈T ) and the messages
exchanged during the execution of the algorithm.
Definition 3. Let β : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a (leakage) function. We say that a deterministic
algorithm is β-indistinguishable if for every set T of agents and for every two inputs x =
(x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) such that xi = yi for every i ∈ T and β(x) = β(y) the
view of T is the same, i.e., viewT (x) = viewT (y).
Definition 4. Let β : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a (leakage) function. We say that a deterministic
algorithm is β-indistinguishable if there exists a simulator Sim such that for every set T of
agents and for every input x = (x1, . . . , xn) the view of T is the same as the output of the
simulator that is given (xi)i∈T and β(x), i.e., Sim(T, (xi)i∈T , β(x)) = viewT (x).
In Definition 4, the simulator is given the inputs of the agents in T and β(x) – the
output of the leakage function applied to the inputs of all agents. The simulator is required
to produce all the messages that were exchanged during the algorithm. If such simulator
exists, then all the information that the adversary can learn from the execution of the
algorithm is implied by the inputs of the parties in T and β(x).
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Claim 1. The two definitions are equivalent.
Proof. Assume that an algorithm is β-indistinguishable according to Definition 4. Let
x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) be two inputs such that xi = yi for every i ∈
T and β(x) = β(y). Thus, Sim(T, (xi)i∈T , β(x)) = Sim(T, (yi)i∈T , β(y)). Therefore, by
Definition 4, viewT (x) = Sim(T, (xi)i∈T , β(x)) = Sim(T, (yi)i∈T , β(y)) = viewT (y).
Assume that an algorithm is β-indistinguishable according to Definition 3. Let x =
(x1, . . . , xn) be any input. We define a simulator for the algorithm. Given T, (xi)i∈T , β(x)
we construct a simulator Sim as follows:
• Finds inputs (yi)i/∈T such that β(y) = β(x), where yi = xi if i ∈ T .
• Outputs viewT (y).
By Definition 3, viewT (x) = viewT (y), thus, Sim(T, (xi)i∈T , β(x)) = viewT (x), as required
in Definition 4.
Note that the simulator is not given the output of the function computed by the al-
gorithm, information that is implied by the messages exchanged in the algorithm. The
simulator can compute the view of T , hence the output, from the information it gets. This
implies that the leakage β(x) (together with (xi)i∈T ) determines the output of the algo-
rithm. This is an important feature of our definition, as we consider search problems where
there can be many possible outputs. The output that an algorithm returns might leak
information on the inputs (see (Beimel et al., 2008)), and it is not clear how to compare the
privacy provided by two algorithms returning different solutions. Our definition bypasses
this problem as it explicitly specifies the leakage.
In this paper, we will focus on a particular function β that returns the public projec-
tion of the problem’s search tree. That is, the algorithms we will consider will have the
property that a set of agents cannot distinguish between two problem instances whose pub-
lic projection and their PST are identical. We will refer to this as PST-indistinguishable
security.
A recently proposed example of privacy w.r.t. a class of domains is cardinality preserving
privacy (Maliah, Shani, & Stern, 2017) where the idea is that agents cannot learn the number
of values of a some variable, such as the number of locations served by a track. (Defining
this formally requires using multi-valued variable domains.) Another notion of privacy
recently introduced is agent privacy (Faltings, Le´aute´, & Petcu, 2008) in which agents are
not aware of other agents with whom they do not have direct interactions – i.e., agents that
require or affect some of the variables that appear in their own actions. This notion is more
natural when such interactions are explicitly modelled using the notion of subset-private
variables (Bonisoli et al., 2014). These notions seem more ad-hoc and weaker than our
definition of privacy. We will not discuss these notions in this paper.
4. A PST-Indistinguishable Algorithm
The goal of this section is to show that secure mafs is PST-Indistinguishable. We will
do it by gradually refining a very simple (and inefficient) algorithm to obtain an algorithm
that is essentially identical to secure mafs, which, as shown by (Maliah et al., 2016), is
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quite efficient in practice, and thus the first algorithm to be both practical and have clear
theoretical guarantees. This gradual progression will make the proofs and ideas simpler.
4.1 A Simple Algorithm
We start with a very simple algorithm, which we shall call PST-Forward Search. The
algorithm simply constructs PST(Π) – the public-projection of the search tree of Π. The
search progresses level by level in the public-projection of the search tree. In a given level
of the tree, each agents ϕi: (1) computes the children of all the nodes in PST(Π), where a
child of a node results from a sequence of private actions followed by a single public action
by the agent, and (2) sends the public state of each child (as well as a description of the path
to the child) to all other agents (removing duplicates). The PST-Forward Search algorithm
is described in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, the agents maintain a set Qd for every level
d in the tree, which will contain all nodes in level d. Every element in the set is a node
represented as a pair (~s,~a), where ~s = (s0, . . . , sm) is a sequence of public states such that
s0 = I
pub and ~a = (a1, . . . , am) is a sequence of public actions. Such a pair describes a
path in the PST from the root to the node in level d. To find the actions that an agent
can apply from a node, it needs to compute the possible private states of that node, as this
information is not contained in the message it received. To do this, the agent reconstructs
its private state, as described in Algorithm compute-private-states. This is, of course,
highly inefficient, but has the desired privacy property.
Algorithm 1 PST Forward Search
1: initialization: d← 0; for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} set Q0 = {(Ipub, )}.
// Qd will contain the states at level d of the PST. Each agent maintains a copy of it.
2: while goal has not been achieved do
3: d← d+ 1; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} agent ϕi sets Qd ← ∅ and Ci ← ∅.
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: Agent ϕi does the following:
6: for each (~s,~a) ∈ Qd−1 do
7: let s be the last state in ~s.
8: executes PS ← compute-private-states(i, ~s,~a).
9: for each private state ps ∈ PS do
10: for each sequence a1, . . . , a` of actions of ϕi applicable from s, ps, where
a1 . . . , a`−1 are private and a` is public do
11: computes (s′, ps′) ← a`(a`−1(· · · a1((s, ps)))) and Ci ← Ci ∪
{((~s, s′), (~a, a`))}.
12: sends Ci to all agents (where the elements of Ci are sent according to some canonical
order).
13: each agent ϕj updates its copy: Qd ← Qd ∪ Ci.
14: if the last state s′ in some ((~s, s′), (~a, a`)) ∈ Ci satisfies the goal then
15: all agents output (~a, a`) and halt.
In Algorithm 1, the messages sent correspond exactly to the PST nodes, and therefore,
two domains with an identical PST will yield identical messages. To enable an exact sim-
8
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Algorithm 2 compute-private-states(i, ~s = (s0, . . . , sm),~a = (a1, . . . , am))
1: /* The algorithm reconstructs the possible private states of agent ϕi starting from
Ipub, Ii and updating it according to the states is ~s and the actions of ϕi in ~a. */
2: let PS0 ← {Ii}.
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: if aj is not an action of ϕi then
5: PSj ← PSj−1.
6: else
7: PSj ← ∅.
8: for each ps ∈ PSj−1 and sequence of private actions a′1, . . . , a′` in Ai such that
a′1, . . . , a′`, aj is applicable from sj−1, ps do
9: let (s′, ps′)← aj(a′`(· · · a′1((sj , ps)))).
10: if s′ = sj then
11: PSj ← PSj ∪ {ps′}.
12: return PSm.
ulation, we need to specify the order in which each agent sends the possible sequences of
children in a given level; we assume that this is done in some canonical order. We supply
the formal proof of privacy in the next claim.
Claim 2. Algorithm 1, the simple private search algorithm, is a PST-indistinguishable
secure algorithm.
Proof. The simulator, given the PST T , traverses the tree level by level, in each level d it
goes over all agents ϕi starting from ϕ1 and ending at ϕn, and for each agent ϕi it sends
the nodes of level d resulting from an action of ϕi, where for each node it sends the public
states and the actions on the path from the root to the node. The order of sending the
nodes is as in the algorithm, according to the fixed canonical order.
4.2 Using IDs
Next, we present an optimization of Algorithm 1, which eliminates the need to compute
private states, and merges some nodes in the tree, reducing the communication complexity
of the algorithm. We call this version: PST-ID Forward Search.
Notice that only actions of ϕi change the local state of ϕi. There are two approaches
to use this observation. In one approach, for each node that is sent, the agent sending
the node can locally keep a list containing its possible local states in that node. When an
agent wants to compute the children of some node, it looks for its last action in the path
to the node and retrieves its possible local states after that action. In the second approach,
which we use, each agent associates the possible local states with a unique id and keeps the
possible local states associated with this id. Each time an agent sends a node in the tree,
it sends the public state of the node as well as the n ids, encoding the local states of each
agent. Notice that each id is not a function of these local states, but only of the particular
PST node with which it is associated. When an agent wants to compute the children of a
node resulting from its actions, it does the following:
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• It retrieves all private states associated with its id in this state.
• It expands the public state and each possible private state using all possible actions
sequences containing and ending with a single public action.
• For every node reached, it generates a new id and associates with it its local state
in the states generated with this projected state, keeping the ids of all other agents
associated with the original node.
• It orders the nodes based on some lexicographic order.
• It sends these nodes, with their public states and their associated ids, in this order to
all agents.
Note that the above algorithm sends at each stage a vector consisting of a public state
and an id for each agent. As this id encodes the private state(s) of the agent, we can think
of the message as representing the state, with its private components encoded. The agent
does not need to send neither the actions leading to the new node nor the father of the
new node. Furthermore, if two (or more) children of a node have the same public state, the
agent does not need to send them twice; it can send one public state, together with the ids
of the other agents taken from the original node, and one new id for the agent associated
with all its possible private states associated with any one of these children. We go one step
further, merging all nodes generated by an agent in level d (possibly with different fathers)
if they have the same public state and the same ids for all other agents.
The formal description of the algorithm appears in Algorithm 3. The algorithm that
recovers a solution after the goal has been reached is described in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 described below returns a solution to the planning problem, i.e., a sequence
of public actions on a path from the root of the PST to a node in level d that satisfies the goal.
Clearly, this sequence of actions should be computed from the information computed by
the algorithm so far. Furthermore, to guarantee privacy, this sequence of actions should be
determined by the PST (that is, a simulator can generate it from the PST). In Algorithm 4
we choose it in a specific way that is fairly efficient (especially, if the agents keep additional
information during Algorithm 3).
In Algorithm 4, we say that sd′−1, j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1 ∈ Qd′−1 leads to sd′ , j1,d′ , . . . , jn,d′ ∈
Qd′ by agent ϕi if there exist private states psd−1 ∈ PSi[jd′−1], psd ∈ PSi[jd′ ], and a
sequence of actions a1, . . . , a` of agent ϕi such that a1, . . . , a`−1 are private and a` is public
and a1, . . . , a` are applicable from sd′−1, psd′−1 and lead to sd′ , psd′ .
Claim 3. Algorithm 3, the PST-ID Forward Search algorithm, is a PST-indistinguishable
secure algorithm.
Proof. We construct a simulator proving that Algorithm 3 is a PST-indistinguishable secure
algorithm. We first supply a high level description of the simulator. The simulator, given
the PST T , traverses the tree level by level and simulates the algorithm. For some level
d, it goes over the agents from agent ϕ1 to ϕn and for each agent it produces a list Ci as
the agent would have sent, using the nodes in level d resulting from an action of ϕi. Recall
that each element in Ci is a public state and a list of n ids. To produce these ids (and to
know which nodes should be merged), for every vertex w in level d the simulator computes
10
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Algorithm 3 PST-ID Forward Search
1: initialization: d ← 0; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} agent ϕi sets idi ← 0, Q0 ←
{(Ipub, 0, . . . , 0)}, and PSi[0]← {Ii}.
//PSi[j] denotes the local states ϕi associated with the id j.
2: while goal has not been achieved do
3: d← d+ 1; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} agent ϕi sets Qd ← ∅ and Ei ← ∅.
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: agent ϕi does the following:
6: for each (s, j1, . . . , jn) ∈ Qd−1 do
7: for each private state ps ∈ PSi[ji] do
8: for each sequence a1, . . . , a` of actions of ϕi applicable from s, ps, where
a1 . . . , a`−1 are private and a` is public do
9: (s′, ps′)← a`(a`−1(· · · a1((s, ps))))
10: Ei ← Ei ∪ {(s′, j1, . . . , ji−1, ji+1, . . . , jn, ps′)}.
11: agent ϕi sorts the elements of Ei, first by the public state, then by the
n − 1 ids, and then by the private state. Let ((s1, j11 , . . . , j1i−1, j1i+1, . . . , j1n, ps1)
. . . , (st, jt1, . . . , j
t
i−1, j
t
i+1, . . . , j
t
n, ps
t)) be the sorted elements of Ei.
12: for u = 1 to t do
13: if u > 1 and su−1 = su and (ju−11 , . . . , j
u−1
i−1 , j
u−1
i+1 , . . . , j
u−1
n ) =
(ju1 , . . . , j
u
i−1, j
u
i+1, . . . , j
u
n) then
14: PSi[idi]← PSi[idi] ∪ {psu}.
15: else
16: idi ← idi + 1.
17: Ci ← Ci ∪ {(su, ju1 , . . . , jui−1, idi, jui+1, . . . , jun)} and PSi[idi]← {psu}.
18: ϕi sends Ci to all agents (where the elements of Ci are sent according to some
canonical order).
19: each agent ϕj updates: Qd ← Qd ∪ Ci.
20: if the state s in some element in Qd satisfies the goal then
21: the agents execute sol← recover-solution, output sol, and halt.
Algorithm 4 recover-solution
1: let sd, j1,d, . . . , jn,d be the first element in Qd that satisfies the goal.
2: /* recall that all agents have a copy of Qd. */
3: for d′ = d downto 1 do
4: let ϕi be the agent performing the last action leading to sd′ , j1,d′ , . . . , jn,d′ .
5: agent ϕi finds the first element sd′−1, j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1 ∈ Qd′−1 leading to
sd′ , j1,d′ , . . . , jn,d′ .
6: let ad′ be the last action in a sequence of actions leading from sd′−1, j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1
to sd′ , j1,d′ , . . . , jn,d′ (if there is more than one such action, choose the lexicographically
first action).
7: agent ϕi sends sd′−1, j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1 and ad′ to all other agents.
8: return a1, . . . , ad.
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a label, denoted by L(w), that contains n ids; this label is computed using the label of the
father of a node w, denoted by f(w). The labels of w and f(w) are the same except for the
ith id, which is carefully computed to simulate Algorithm 3. After reaching the first level
in which there is a node satisfying the goal, the simulator, using the PST tree, reconstructs
the solution that Algorithm 4 returns.
The simulator is formally described in Algorithm 5. The input in Algorithm 5 is a PST
T ; we denote its root by root. It can be easily proved by induction that the simulator
computes the same messages as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 5 Simulator for Algorithm 3 – The PST-ID Forward Search Algorithm
Input: A PST tree T
1: initialization: d← 0; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} set idi ← 0, Q0 ← ((Ipub, 0, . . . , 0)).
2: while goal has not been achieved do
3: d← d+ 1; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} set Qd ← ∅, Ci ← ∅, and E˜i ← ∅.
4: L[root] = (0, . . . , 0).
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: for each node w in level d s.t. the edge (f(w), w) is labeled by an action of ϕi do
7: let L(f(w)) = (j1, . . . , jn) and s
′ be the state of node w.
8: E˜i ← E˜i ∪ {(s′, j1, . . . , ji−1, ji+1, . . . , jn, w)}.
9: sort the elements of E˜i, first by the public state, then by the n − 1 ids, and then
by w.
10: let ((s1, j11 , . . . , j
1
i−1, j
1
i+1, . . . , j
1
n, w
1), . . . , (st, jt1, . . . , j
t
i−1, j
t
i+1, . . . , j
t
n, w
t)) be the
sorted elements of E˜i.
11: for u = 1 to t do
12: if u = 1 or su−1 6= su or (ju−11 , . . . , ju−1i−1 , ju−1i+1 , . . . , ju−1n ) 6=
(ju1 , . . . , j
u
i−1, j
u
i+1, . . . , j
u
n) then
13: idi ← idi + 1.
14: Ci ← Ci ∪ {(su, ju1 , . . . , jui−1, idi, jui+1, . . . , jun)}.
15: L(wu)← (ju1 , . . . , jui−1, idi, jui+1, . . . , jun).
16: send Ci on behalf of ϕi to all agents (where the elements of Ci are sent according
to some canonical order).
17: for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} set Qd ← Qd ∪ Ci.
18: if the state s in some element in Qd satisfies the goal then
19: execute sol← sim-recover-solution, output sol, and halt.
4.3 Merging More Nodes
In PST-ID Forward Search, an agent merged two nodes if they were in the same level, they
had the same public state, and the ids of the other agents were the same. The simple case
when two nodes were merged is if they had the same parent and there were two sequences of
actions ending with the same public state (if the last action in these sequences is the same,
then they are already merged in the PPT). There are somewhat more complicated scenario
when nodes are merged. For example, suppose that in some public state s and private state
ps in level d, agent ϕi can apply two sequences of public actions a1, a2 and a3, a4, and both
12
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Algorithm 6 sim-recover-solution
1: let sd, j1,d, . . . , jn,d be the first element in Qd that satisfies the goal and Wd be all nodes
w in level d whose public state is s and whose label L(w) is j1,d, . . . , jn,d.
2: for d′ = d downto 1 do
3: let Fd′−1 ← {f(w)|w ∈Wd′}.
4: let sd′−1, j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1 be the first element in {(s(v), L(v)|v ∈ Fd′−1} (where s(v)
is the public state in the node v).
5: let ad′ be the lexicographically first action labeling an edge from a node v ∈ Fd′−1
such that s(v) = sd′−1 and L(v) = j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1 to a node in Wd′ .
6: let Wd′−1 be all nodes in Fd′−1 such that s(v) = sd′−1, L(v) = j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1 and
there exists an edge from them to a node in Wd′ labeled by the action ad′ .
7: Send the message sd′−1, j1,d′−1, . . . , jn,d′−1 and ad′ .
8: return a1, . . . , ad.
sequences result in the same public state s′. Then, the resulting two nodes are in the same
level d + 2 and they will be merged. However, suppose that also action a5 is applicable in
the state s, ps and results in state s′ (in level d+ 1). The resulting node is not in the same
level and the previous nodes are not merged with the new node. As a result, the current
algorithm will send two nodes that are identical in every respect, except for its id. One key
motivation for the original secure mafs algorithm was to prevent this situation and never
send two nodes that differ only in the private state of the sending agent.
There is a simple (though probably inefficient) way of overcoming this. For this observe
that, under the assumption that an agent will never send two states that differ only in
its own id, the only way two states s′, s′′ generated by an agent ϕi can be identical is if
they have a common ancestor s, and s′ and s′′ were generated by applying actions of ϕi
only. As in the above example, these could be sequences containing different numbers of
public actions, and hence at different levels of the PST. However, once a public action is
applied by some other agent ϕj , its id will change, and hence s
′ and s′′ will differ on ϕj ’s
id. Given this observation, it is easy to modify PST-ID FS to have the property that an
agent ϕi never sends two nodes that are identical in all but (possibly) its id, which we call
PST-ID-E Forward Search. Whereas in PST-ID FS an agent will send each state obtained
by applying exactly one public action, in PST-ID-E, the agent expands the entire local
sub-tree below a node in its open list. That is, it will consider state reachable by applying
more than one (of its) public actions. This could be a large sub-tree, of course, but under
the assumption that all variables have finite-domains, it is finite and with appropriate book
keeping (maintaining a closed list) can be constructed in finite time. Thus, the only change
is in line 8 of Algorithm 3, where the new line is
for each sequence a1, . . . , a` of actions of ϕi applicable from s, ps, where a1 . . . , a`−1
are public or private and a` is public do.
Claim 4. The PST-ID-E Forward Search algorithm is a PST-indistinguishable secure al-
gorithm.
Proof. This follows immediately from the proof of Claim 3 using the following observation:
Take the PST, and add to it additional edges between every node and all its descendants
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that are reachable using public actions of the same agent only. Now, use the simulator for
PST-ID FS on this modified tree.
Note that given the modified tree in the proof above, it is possible to recover the original
ordering by simply taking into account the number of public actions that were applied in
the path from the initial state to the current state.
Claim 5. In the PST-ID-E Forward Search algorithm, an agent never sends two states s, s′
that differ only in its own id.
Proof. Consider two states s, s′ sent by an agent ϕi during the run of the algorithm. Let
the level of a state denote the number of times (plus 1) a public action was applied in the
path to this state by an agent such that this agent did not apply the previous public action
on the path. First, assume that s, s′ have a common ancestor such that all actions on the
paths from this ancestor to s and s′ are of the same agent ϕi. In this case, if they are
identical in all other respects, an id that contains both their private states is formed, and
only one state is sent. Suppose that s, s′ do not have such ancestor. Consider the sequence
of states sent by agents on the paths from the root to s and s′. At some points, these states
differ, and hence the id of the agent that sent the states will differ too. But from this point
on, the ids of all sending agent must change.
4.4 Heuristic Search
So far, the algorithms we described expanded nodes in breadth-first manner, and followed
some canonical ordering within each level. PST-ID-E also fits this view, when levels are
defined such that the level increases only when a public action is applied by an agent who
did not apply the last public action. However, the privacy guarantees do not rest on this
property. In principle, the PST can be traversed in any order, and all the above results are
correct provided the traversal ordering is a function of the PST only. Thus, for example,
any heuristic search algorithm can be used, provided the heuristic depends on the history
of the public part of the state only, or on the current public state. This follows trivially
from the fact that a simulator that has access to the PST can simulate any such ordering.
4.5 secure mafs
We are now ready to describe a PST-indistinguishable secure algorithm that is essentially
a synchronous, breadth-first version of secure mafs (Brafman, 2015). secure mafs is
similar to PST-ID Forward Search (i.e., a message is sent after the application of a public
action), except that an agent never sends two states that differ only in its own private state
– in our case, its own id. The PST-ID-E algorithm has this property, but requires that an
agent first explore its entire sub-tree.
To prevent resending identical states (modulo its own id), in secure mafs the agent
must maintain a list of states sent so far. Whenever it wishes to send a state s with local
state ps, it first checks if the state s was sent before. If it was, it simply updates the id
associated with s to include ps.
However, this change alone is insufficient to maintain completeness. See Figure 1 for
illustration of the following example. Consider some state s that is being expanded by ϕi.
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Figure 1: An example for secure mafs.
Suppose that the non-private part of the state is identical in s′ = a2(a1(s)) and s, but the
local state is different. Here a1, a2 are public actions of ϕi that only change the private state
of ϕi. Let a3 be a public action of another agent ϕj and a4 an action of ϕi. We claim that
ϕi may never generate a4(a3(s
′)), although, as we shall see, it should. To see this, note that
ϕi will receive a3(s) from ϕj and will expand it before it generates s
′ = a2(a1(s)). Now,
suppose that a4 cannot be applied in a3(s) because of ϕi’s local state, but it can be applied
in a3(s
′). Eventually, ϕi will generate s′ = a2(a1(s)). However, it will not send it to ϕj .
It will simply update the id associated with s to include the local state of s′. Since s was
already expanded, it will not attempt to re-expand it, and will miss the state a4(a3(s
′)).
To address this issue, secure mafs must re-expand states previously expanded when
their id is modified. Specifically, in the above example, when we modify the id of a2(a1(s)),
secure mafs will add a3(s
′) (with the appropriate ids) to a local queue and later see that
a4 is applicable from this state.
The pseudo-code for secure mafs appears in Algorithm 7. At each level we generate a
number of lists of states: The set Ci,d contains the new states that agent ϕi created in level
d; these states are sent to all agents. The set Qd contains the new states created in level
d by some agent, that is Qd = ∪1≤i≤nCi,d. Furthermore, the set LQi,d will contain states
that were generated by ϕi, but are not being sent because a similar state was sent earlier.
These lists are initially empty. In round d, each agent ϕi expands all states in Qd−1 and in
LQi,d−1 using any sequence of private actions followed by a single public action. It collects
all these states into Ed. This list is sorted and all its elements are processed in order. For
each element, agent ϕi checks if this state did not appear before in the states it created
(namely, in Ci,d′ for some d
′ < d), and if a similar state s′ that differs only in ϕi’s private
state appeared earlier. If the latter is the case, let id denote the id of agent ϕi in s
′. We
now go over all states in previous Qt’s that have the id id, and add them to an appropriate
LQ list. The list selected reflects the number of public actions that were applied to reach
them from s′.
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Algorithm 7 secure mafs
1: initialization: d ← 0; Q0 ← {(Ipub, 0, . . . , 0)}; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} agent ϕi sets
idi ← 0, PSi[0]← {Ii}, and LQi,d′ ← ∅ for every d′.
2: while goal has not been achieved do
3: d← d+ 1; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} agent ϕi sets Qd ← ∅, Ci,d ← ∅, and Ei ← ∅.
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: agent ϕi does the following:
6: for each (s, j1, . . . , jn) ∈ Qd−1 ∪ LQi,d−1 do
7: for each private state ps ∈ PSi[ji] do
8: if (s, j1, . . . , jn) and ps where not evaluated previously by ϕi then
9: for each sequence a1, . . . , a` of actions of ϕi applicable from s, ps, where
a1 . . . , a`−1 are private and a` is public do
10: (s′, ps′)← a`(a`−1(· · · a1((s, ps)))).
11: if (s′, j1, . . . , ji−1, ji+1, . . . , jn, ps′) was not generated before then
12: Ei ← Ei ∪ {(s′, j1, . . . , ji−1, ji+1, . . . , jn, ps′)}.
13: agent ϕi sorts the elements of Ei, first by the public state, and then by the
n − 1 ids, and then by the private state. Let ((s1, j11 , . . . , j1i−1, j1i+1, . . . , j1n, ps1)
. . . , (st, jt1, . . . , j
t
i−1, j
t
i+1, . . . , j
t
n, ps
t)) be the sorted elements of Ei.
14: for u = 1 to t do
15: if there exist d′ < d and id such that (su, ju1 , . . . , jui−1, id, j
u
i+1, . . . , j
u
n) ∈ Ci,d′
then
16: update PSi[id]← PSi[id] ∪ {psu}.
17: for each (s, j1, . . . , ji−1, ji+1, . . . , jn) s.t. (s, j1, . . . , ji−1, id, ji+1, . . . , jn) ∈ Qd′′
for some d′′ < d do
18: update LQi,d+(d′′−d′) ← LQi,d+(d′′−d′) ∪ {(s, j1, . . . , ji−1, id, ji+1, . . . , jn)}.
19: else if u > 1 and su−1 = su and (ju−11 , . . . , j
u−1
i−1 , j
u−1
i+1 , . . . , j
u−1
n ) =
(ju1 , . . . , j
u
i−1, j
u
i+1, . . . , j
u
n) then
20: PSi[idi]← PSi[idi] ∪ {psu}. //Collects ids of similar states in a level
21: else
22: update idi ← idi + 1
23: update Ci,d ← Ci,d∪{(su, ju1 , . . . , jui−1, idi, jui+1, . . . , jun)}, and PSi[idi]← {psu}.
24: agent ϕi sends Ci,d to all agents (where the elements of Ci,d are sent according to
some canonical order).
25: each agent ϕj updates: Qd ← Qd ∪ Ci,d.
26: if the state s in some element in Qd satisfies the goal then
27: the agents execute sol← recover-solution, output sol, and halt.
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Observe that secure mafs enjoys the property that an agent ϕi will never send two
states that differ only in its own id.
Algorithm 8 Simulator for Algorithm 7 – secure mafs
Input: A PST tree T
1: initialization: d← 0; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} set idi ← 1, Q0 ← ((Ipub, 0, . . . , 0)).
2: while goal has not been achieved do
3: d← d+ 1; for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} set Qd ← ∅, Ci,d ← ∅, and E˜i ← ∅.
4: L[root] = (0, . . . , 0).
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: for each node w in level d s.t. the edge (f(w), w) is labeled by an action of ϕi do
7: let L(f(w)) = (j1, . . . , jn) and s
′ be the state of node w.
8: E˜i ← E˜i ∪ {(s′, j1, . . . , ji−1, ji+1, . . . , jn, w)}.
9: sort the elements of E˜i, first by the public state, then by the n − 1 ids, and then
by w.
10: let ((s1, j11 , . . . , j
1
i−1, j
1
i+1, . . . , j
1
n, w
1), . . . , (st, jt1, . . . , j
t
i−1, j
t
i+1, . . . , j
t
n, w
t)) be the
sorted elements of E˜i.
11: for u = 1 to t do
12: if there exists d′ < d and id such that (su, ju1 , . . . , jui−1, id, j
u
i+1, . . . , j
u
n) ∈ Ci,d′
then
13: L(wu)← (ju1 , . . . , jui−1, id, jui+1, . . . , jun).
14: else
15: if u = 1 or su−1 6= su or (ju−11 , . . . , ju−1i−1 , ju−1i+1 , . . . , ju−1n ) 6=
(ju1 , . . . , j
u
i−1, j
u
i+1, . . . , j
u
n) then
16: idi ← idi + 1.
17: Ci,d ← Ci,d ∪ {(su, ju1 , . . . , jui−1, idi, jui+1, . . . , jun)}.
18: L(wu)← (ju1 , . . . , jui−1, idi, jui+1, . . . , jun).
19: send Ci,d on behalf of ϕi to all agents (where the elements of Ci,d are sent according
to some canonical order).
20: for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} set Qd ← Qd ∪ Ci,d.
21: if the state s in some element in Qd satisfies the goal then
22: execute sol← sim-recover-solution, output sol, and halt.
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